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H I G H L I G H T S  
• Region contributed to 50% of global CO2 emissions and 92% of increase in 1995–2015. 
• Region was a net exporter of trade-embodied emissions despite high carbon intensity. 
• Carbon leakage has gradually moved from China and India to other developing nations. 
• The nations had diverse trends of carbon footprint due to technological differences. 
• The drivers of changes in regional CO2 emissions varied across nations and over time.  
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A B S T R A C T   
A continuous growth of international trade, especially between developing countries, has greatly increased 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions associated with energy consumption over the past two decades. Given the more 
intensified intraregional cooperation and trade within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this study aims to trace 
the imbalance of CO2 embodied in trade between nations in BRI and the rest of the world, providing new insights 
into the drivers of emissions growth by contrasting consumption, production and technological differences-based 
perspectives. Results indicate that the BRI contributed to over 50% of global carbon footprint and 92% of its 
increase in 1995–2015. The BRI was a net exporter of trade-embodied emissions, whose technological-adjusted 
carbon footprint remained remarkably large due to comparatively high carbon intensity. Geographically, carbon 
leakage has gradually moved from China and India to other BRI countries, especially to Southeast Asia, West Asia 
and Africa. Technological change was the key driver of emissions reduction, followed by the change in industrial 
structure. The growth in final demand per capita was the most important driver for the growth of CO2 emissions 
in BRI. Improving carbon efficiency remains a critical step for BRI nations to slow down not only emissions 
growth but also carbon leakage. The paper managed to provide novel insights into the carbon leakage in BRI by 
contrasting the consumption, production and technological differences-based perspectives, thus being able to 
better inform policymakers on region-specific low-carbon transition and global climate governance.   
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1. Introduction 
The world has undergone unprecedented environmental change as a 
result of increasing international trade with profound implications for 
sustainable development [1,2]. Numerous studies have been conducted 
to measure the environmental footprint of international trade [3,4], 
with particular emphasis on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions regarding 
energy consumptions [5,6,7]. Prior research shows strong evidence of 
shifting CO2 emissions from developed to developing nations through 
international trade (also referred to as ‘carbon leakage’, defined as an 
increase of CO2 emissions in one country/region as a result of an 
emissions reduction by another country/region with a strict climate 
policy) [8,9], allowing some developed nations to maintain a relatively 
small magnitude of territorial emissions [5]. 
Most existing studies so far have focused on the attribution of 
worldwide carbon leakage to trade between developing and developed 
countries, and only few focused exclusively on the CO2 emissions asso-
ciated with the variation in trade between developing countries. For 
instance, Meng et al. [10] reported that the South–South trade was more 
than doubled between 2004 and 2011 and accounted for 46% of the 
increase in global CO2 emissions. Han et al. [11] tracked the transfer of 
CO2 emissions embodied in trade between the Belt and Road initiative 
(BRI) nations and others for the year of 2012, asserting that more than 
95% of world’s net embodied carbon exports came from BRI. This rapid 
growth reflects a new phase of globalization and might reshape the map 
of global carbon footprint. Here we made use of carbon footprint as a 
measure of CO2 emissions, like most of other studies [12]. Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned research made use of a conventional multi-regional 
input − output (MRIO) approach which does not take into account the 
technological differences between nations in the production processes of 
traded goods. 
The MRIO approach has been recognized as the most popular tool to 
perform a consumption-based accounting (CBA), aiming at determining 
national responsibility for climate change and evaluating the perfor-
mance of mitigation policies [13]. Together with the production-based 
accounting (PBA), these two inventories (i.e., CBA and PBA) show 
different pictures of CO2 emissions along the global supply chains by 
taking imports and exports into account, respectively [14,15]. Despite 
the wide application of both PBA and CBA, it has moved into a critical 
reflection of their methodologies, with a critique that national emissions 
accounting should reflect not only the total amount of carbon footprint 
in each single economy, but also the contribution to global emissions 
reduction [16]. Namely, the CBA and PBA only consider the CO2 emis-
sions associated with consumption or production, neglecting the 
comparative advantage of technology advances for responsibility allo-
cation. If a country has more advanced production technologies than its 
trading partners, it brings a higher comparative advantage than the 
trading partners for equal value production. As a result, this country still 
contributes to global emissions reduction by exporting more products 
via international trade, and should not be criticized for its higher na-
tional emissions [17]. To precisely depict the national responsibility for 
emissions transferred by trade, it makes sense to take into account the 
differences of carbon intensities (equal to dividing the total carbon 
emissions by total industrial output) in the same sectors between 
importing and exporting nations in addition to CBA. Technology- 
adjusted consumption-based accounting (TCBA) has been proved to be 
effective in capturing the differences between the carbon intensities of 
different economies, but has not been applied widely in empirical 
studies for more validation [16]. 
Previous studies showed that developed economies (e.g., EU27 and 
USA) generally have much lower emissions based on PBA than on CBA 
due to their outsourcing emissions to less developed countries/regions. 
Conversely, developing countries (e.g., China and Brazil) produce and 
export a large number of goods to developed countries, leaving envi-
ronmental damage and loss of biodiversity within their own borders 
[13]. Although the trends of TCBA in the USA and EU27 remained 
similar, only the latter had improved its domestic carbon intensity at a 
rate faster than the world average [16]. This approach has also been 
successfully applied to discussion on the trade between Sweden and the 
UK, where the estimate of carbon leakage under the TCBA approach was 
found less serious than the one based on conventional CBA for the period 
1995–2009 [17]. With respect to developing countries, their carbon 
intensities were found to be more diverse due to huge technological 
differences, even though in general they were net carbon exporters [16]. 
The BRI was proposed by the Chinese government as an effort to 
support international trade and to provide collective investment funds 
for infrastructure development among developing nations in 2013 [18]. 
It spans more than 60 countries, covering 64% of the global population 
with 30% of global GDP [19]. In the past decades, the bilateral trade 
flows between these BRI countries experienced an increasing tendency 
[20], accounting for more than 25% of global trade [21]. Thus, tracing 
the CO2 emissions of BRI nations can be of global significance. Despite 
the growing interest and discussions on the multiple socio-economic 
benefits, the BRI has led to a concern about carbon leakage which 
potentially drives up the regional and global emissions [22,23]. For 
instance, it has been argued that China may reallocate its domestic 
pollution and overcapacity through the BRI [24] and is playing the 
leading role in driving carbon footprints within this area [25]. The 
carbon inequality and economic development of the countries within 
and outside BRI were compared as well, but without investigating the 
driving forces for emission growth and the impact of technological dif-
ferences on responsibility allocation among those nations [26]. 
In contrast to the growing cooperation and trade within BRI, the 
impact of trade and technological differences between BRI countries on 
their CO2 emissions remains poorly understood. To fill in the research 
gaps, this paper attempted to make novel contributions by: (1) pre-
senting a comprehensive spatio-temporal analysis of CO2 emissions 
embodied in trade of nations within and beyond BRI; (2) contrasting 
PBA and CBA schemes, but also employing a revised MRIO analysis to 
account for technological-adjusted carbon footprint that adjusts for the 
difference in carbon efficiency (the inverse of carbon intensity) in ex-
ports; (3) identifying various drivers for the changes in BRI’s carbon 
footprint to explicate the impacts of carbon leakage among nations over 
time; and (4) proposing policy recommendations for potential solutions 
to easing the carbon imbalance of international trade in BRI. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Study area and data sources 
The BRI covers a large number of countries in Asia, Europe and Af-
rica, most of which are developing nations. While there is no consensus 
on the exact number of BRI members, this paper selected 62 countries as 
per the general definition of BRI and data availability [24,27], and 
divided them roughly into six geographical regions, including Central 
Asia, CMR (China, Mongolia and Russia), Europe, South Asia, Southeast 
Asia, and West Asia & Africa (the full list was presented in Supple-
mentary Information S1). 
A times series of monetary MRIO tables with a temporal coverage 
(1995–2015) were collected from Eora database (http://www.worldmr 
io.com/countrywise/), where the global economy is presented as 189 
economies, split into 26-sector and 6-final-demand categories with 
matching environmental and social satellite accounts. We chose the Eora 
database because of its relatively high resolution of economies, wide 
coverage of countries in BRI, and up-to-date data (up to 2015) [28]. 
Eora26 was adopted for the consistency of sectoral classifications among 
all nations. We put together other nations or regions outside BRI as the 
rest of the world (RoW), as the aim of this paper is to measure the 
imbalance of CO2 emissions embodied in trade between nations in BRI 
and RoW, with the belief that attempts to disaggregate the latter 
represent an unnecessary distraction. The data on total CO2 emissions 
generated from energy consumptions in Eora satellite accounts were 
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collected from EDGAR to keep consistent with other studies to measure 
the carbon footprint of nations [9]. Population data were derived from 
the World Bank’s Public Database. 
2.2. Consumption-based & production-based accounting 
MRIO approach is frequently used to link the production emissions to 
consumption activities through domestic and international supply 
chains [15,29]. The approach was originally developed by Leontief in 
the 1930s [30], using the basic monetary balance shown as: 
X = (I − A)− 1Y = LY (1)  
where X is a vector of total output, A is a technical coefficients matrix, 
and Y is a final demand vector. (I − A)− 1 is known as the Leontief inverse 
or the complete demand coefficient matrix, whose elements capture 
direct and indirect effects from a unit change in the final demand. 
The basic model has been extended in two directions: by the subdi-
vision of the economy in a number of regions/countries (hereafter re-
gions) that are connected by trade, and by the addition of supplementary 
environmental accounts, for instance for CO2 emissions. 
In a MRIO framework, regions set-up can be implemented with 










where A21 is the inputs from region 2 to region 1. The final demand 









Here y21 is the demand by region 1 for product produced in region 2. 
The environmental extension is made by adding a matrix of envi-
ronmental coefficients E. Note that, in our case, there is only one sub-









For instance, E1 contains the per-sector intensities of CO2 emissions 
for region 1, where the intensity means emissions divided by the in-
dustrial output of each sector in region 1. 
The overall environmental multi-region set-up is: 
F = ELY (2) 









For instance, F12 is a vector indicating the CO2 emissions in region 1 
that are attributed to the final demand in region 2. 
We may clarify the computational structure further by mentioning 
the size of the different objects:  
• there are p sectors;  
• there are r regions;  
• there are e environmental issues (note that e = 1 in case of a carbon 
footprint only). 
Thus, we find that:  
• matrix Y has r × p rows and r columns;  
• matrix A has r × p rows and r × p columns;  
• matrix E has e rows and r × p columns;  
• matrix F has e rows and r columns. 
By diagonalizing matrix E, we are able to keep track of the emissions 
per region. This is important for our study of emissions imbalance. In 
particular, the territorial emission under PBA, F(PBA), for region s, is 




Fsi (3)  
effectively adding up the emissions from production in region s to meet 
final demand in all regions (i = 1,⋯,r). Likewise, the emissions based on 





The balance of emissions embodied in trade (BEET), for region s, is 
therefore: 
F(BEET)s = F(PBA)s − F(CBA)s =
∑r
i=1
(Fsi − Fis) (5) 
This balance can also be regarded as the result of comparing emis-
sions through import to region s (F(IM)s) and export from region s (F(EX)s): 


































2.3. Technology-adjusted consumption-based accounting 
The purpose of using TCBA here is to better estimate how a country’s 
exports affect global emissions, by replacing domestic carbon intensities 
with world market averages when calculating export-related emissions 
[32]. This will allow us to estimate how much emissions in average are 
saved or caused if the same product is produced using world-average 
technology represented by emission intensity. While following the 
general calculation principle of CBA, TCBA differs in the sense that it 
considers the technological differences between countries by subtracting 
export-related emissions based on the average carbon intensity for the 
relevant sector on the world market [33]. Thus, the world-average 






where Fti is the emissions of sector t in region i, and Xti is the output of 
sector t in region i. The emissions of region s under TCBA, which we will 
denote by F(TCBA)s, can be expressed as follow: 




Fsi − F(TEX)s  
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qtXtsi (9)  
whereF(TCBA)sis the emissions of region s based on TCBA inventory, and 
F(TEX)s is adjusted emissions embodied in exports by multiplying export 






qtXtsi. In this case, the calculation will meet the requirements 
of sensitivity and additivity for national emissions accounting, which 
could refer to [16] for more details. Similar to Equation (6), F(TBEET)s is 
the technology-adjusted balance of emissions embodied in trade 
(TBEET) of region s, and therefore can be a good proxy for comparison 
with BEET by considering technological differences between national 
and global markets, following the formula: 
F(TBEET)s = F(TEX)s − F(IM)s (10)  
2.4. Structural decomposition analysis 
To better understand how CO2 emissions of BRI countries have 
changed over time, we employed a structural decomposition analysis 
(SDA) to identify the main drivers of emissions at the country and sector 
levels. While both SDA and index decomposition analysis (IDA) have 
proved effective in achieving that goal [5,34], the former makes more 
sense because it can distinguish a range of direct and indirect effects on 
industrial structure that the latter fails to capture [35]. 
Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) is recommended for imple-
menting SDA due to its relatively simple computation, especially when 
the number of factors is large [36]. Thus, this study conducted the LMDI 
approach as an innovative way of SDA for measuring the drivers of 
emissions. Based on the Equation (2), the vector of final demand Y can 
be further divided into four drivers: u is commodity structure of final 
demand, representing the ratio of different final demands from sectors in 
total final demand, b is final demand structure of the economic system, v 
is final demand/capita (y/p), and p is population [36,37] (for details see 
Supplementary Information S2): 
F = ELY = ELubvp (11) 
The central idea of SDA is to decompose the changes of its de-
terminants resulting in a cumulative sum of contributions within a 
certain period of time [38]. Suppose that the total carbon footprint of 
production at time 0 and t is F0 and Ft, respectively, the period is divided 
into four periods of time in this study (1995–2000, 2000–2005, 
2005–2010 and 2010–2015). The variation in carbon footprint is 
decomposed into the following six factors: 
ΔF = Ft − F0 = ΔE +ΔL+Δu+Δb+Δv+Δp (12)  
where ΔF is the change of CO2 emissions, ΔE is the CO2 intensity effect, 
ΔL is the Leontief structure effect, Δu is the effect of product structure of 
final demand,Δb is the final demand structure effect, Δv is the level of 
final demand per capita effect, and Δp is the population effect. Detailed 
calculations were shown in Supplementary Information S2. 
3. Results 
3.1. CO2 emissions in BRI nations from 1995 to 2015 
By tracing CO2 emissions under PBA from 1995 to 2015 (Fig. 1), we 
observed that the emissions of BRI nations more than doubled during 
this period, especially those embodied in domestic uses and exports 
among BRI nations (marked with blue line) which increased from 7.85 
Gt to 17.50 Gt. The CO2 emissions embodied in the exports from BRI 
nations to RoW experienced a relatively stable rise (from 1.88 Gt to 3.31 
Gt) across the whole period. In addition, Fig. 1 illustrates the CO2 
emissions of BRI nations and their contributions to global total emis-
sions, where the proportion of emissions embodied in exports from BRI 
to RoW maintained at a relatively stable level (around 9%), while the 
proportion of emissions within BRI rose by 17% over the period, ac-
counting for more than 50% of the global emissions. 
We compared the emissions from 26 sectors of BRI nations in 2015 
(Fig. 2). Large differences in emissions can be witnessed across a variety 
of sectors, in which the Electricity, gas and water, Petroleum, chemical and 
non-metallic mineral products as well as Transport sectors ranked the top 
three, both within BRI nations and in the exports to RoW. The CO2 
emissions from the sectors of Electrical and machinery, Metal products, 
Construction, Food & beverages, Mining and quarrying, Agriculture and 
Transport equipment ranged from 208 Mt CO2 to 609 Mt CO2 within BRI 
nations. For instance, the sector of Mining and quarrying had CO2 emis-
sions of 211 Mt CO2 embodied in exports to RoW, and those of 
Fig. 1. CO2 emissions within BRI nations and embodied in exports to RoW in 1995–2015. Within BRI means CO2 emissions embodied in domestic uses and exports 
among BRI nations; BRI ->RoW means CO2 emissions embodied in exports from BRI nations to the rest of the world. 
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Agriculture, Construction, and Food & beverages had relatively low emis-
sions in exports to RoW. 
3.2. Regional comparison of emissions under three inventories 
The CO2 emissions under PBA, CBA, and TCBA for BRI nations and 
RoW from 1995 to 2015 are discussed in a comparative analysis (Fig. 3). 
For the overall trend of BRI nations (Fig. 3a), all of the emissions under 
these three inventories soared during the study period. As the difference 
between PBA and CBA refers to the net emissions embodied in trade 
[39], we can see overall the BRI nations acted as a net exporter of 
emissions embodied in trade, with a value of net exports from 1.42 Gt in 
1995 to 2.30 Gt in 2015. The carbon footprint of BRI nations with TCBA 
was always higher than that with CBA, and the gap continued to enlarge 
throughout the period. 
In contrast, the RoW acted as a net importer of emissions embodied 
in trade (Fig. 3b), with small increases of carbon footprint under the 
three inventories between 1995 and 2007, and then fell to the bottom in 
2009, with a slight rebound afterwards. Overall, the values under the 
three inventories remained stable across the period, showing that the 
results of CBA were the highest, those of PBA were the lowest, and those 
of the TCBA were medium. 
We further investigated the BRI’s CO2 emissions by region (Fig. 4). 
Several trends can be observed. For CMR (Fig. 4a), the trend in emissions 
somehow coincided with the whole picture of BRI nations because of the 
inclusion of China that accounted for around half of the BRI’s total 
emissions, although China’s gap between CBA and TCBA was narrower 
than that of BRI. For South Asia (Fig. 4b) and West Asia & Africa 
(Fig. 4c), emissions increased rapidly since 1995 by implementing all 
the three inventories, but the trends seemed to be quite different. The 
Fig. 2. CO2 emissions of 26 sectors within BRI nations and embodied in exports to RoW in 2015.  
Fig. 3. CO2 emissions of BRI nations and RoW under PBA, CBA and TCBA in 1995–2015.  
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carbon footprint under TCBA in West Asia & Africa was substantially 
larger than that under PBA and CBA in the second half of the study 
period. When it comes to South Asia, the carbon footprints under PBA 
and TCBA were numerically close. The emissions of Central Asia 
(Fig. 4d) and Southeast Asia (Fig. 4e) showed similar values for the three 
inventories, where the carbon footprint under CBA in Southeast Asia was 
larger than that under PBA in the last five years. For European nations in 
BRI (Fig. 4f), the carbon footprint experienced a decreasing trend over 
the period, which was analogous to what can be observed in Fig. 3b, 
while the values of TCBA were larger than those of PBA, and those of 
CBA were the lowest. 
3.3. Spatiotemporal variation of emissions under three inventories 
By tracing the spatiotemporal variation in responsibilities for CO2 
emissions among BRI nations under the three inventories between 1995 
and 2015 (Fig. 5), we found that around half countries had a higher 
carbon footprint with PBA than that with CBA (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5b). Over the 
past two decades, a shift in the nations’ role from net importers to net 
exporters was observed for Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines, while 
Romania, Poland and United Arab Emirates were on the opposite. China, 
India and Russia ranked the top three net carbon exporters. In particular, 
China and India’s emissions more than doubled and quadrupled, 
respectively in 1995–2015. Other nations showed relatively higher CBA 
than PBA. This was particularly true for the top three countries 
(Singapore, Turkey and Greece). 
However, more than 40 nations in BRI showed greater TCBA than 
CBA in both 1995 and 2015 when it comes to the technological differ-
ences in exports (Fig. 5c, Fig. 5d), suggesting that these nations should 
take more responsibilities for CO2 emissions than the results of CBA. 
China, India and Russia again led the trend, with substantially larger 
emissions under TCBA than under CBA. Singapore showed a tremen-
dously large gap between CBA and TCBA than others, highlighting its 
import-oriented economy. The gaps between CBA and TCBA between 
1995 and 2015 varied widely among nations. For instance, Russia 
experienced a substantial increase in the gap by 154.93 Mt CO2, which 
showed an improvement in the gap between CBA and TCBA. India 
experienced a decline of 235.38 Mt CO2 instead, indicating an enlarging 
gap between CBA and TCBA. 
3.4. Carbon leakage among BRI nations 
To measure the emissions embodied in imports and exports among 
BRI nations, we calculated the BEET for each country in 1995 and 2015, 
Fig. 4. CO2 emissions of regions in BRI under PBA, CBA and TCBA in 1995–2015.  
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respectively, compared to the TBEET (Fig. 6). Among these countries, 
China, India and Russia had the largest amount of emissions embodied 
in trade with BRI nations, and therefore, the changes of CO2 emissions 
embodied in trade between the six regions of BRI and China (Fig. 6a), 
India (Fig. 6b) and Russia (Fig. 6c) were displayed both from the per-
spectives of BEET and TBEET. 
China’s net CO2 emissions embodied in trade (marked with dark blue 
bars and light blue bars) more than doubled between 1995 and 2015, 
showing that China overall acted as a net carbon exporter in BRI area. 
The BEET between China and other nations or regions increased by two 
to six times. Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Poland, UAE, India and Viet 
Nam were China’s main exporters of emissions, all of which had more 
than 10 Mt CO2 of BEET in 2015. Meanwhile, Central Asia and Russia 
were China’s main importers of emissions which increased by more than 
five times over the period. By comparison, when considering the 
technology-adjusted factor for emissions embodied in trade between 
China and other regions or nations, similar trends were observed for 
both TBEET and BEET, with values of TBEET much smaller than those of 
BEET. 
Central Asia and Europe were the main importers of emissions 
embodied in trade for Russia within BRI in 1995, while Russia was a net 
carbon exporter for other regions in BRI; China, Turkey and Slovakia 
were net exporters of emissions for Russia, with more than 10 Mt CO2. In 
2015, a shift of role from a net importer to exporter of emissions 
embodied in trade with Europe was found for Russia, while the CO2 
emissions embodied in imports from Central Asia increased by more 
than four times from 1995 to 2015. China and those nations in West Asia 
& Africa contributed more than other BRI nations to the BEET with 
Russia in 2015. The values for TBEET between Russia and other regions 
or nations were, in most cases, continuously smaller than those for 
BEET. 
India’s net CO2 emissions embodied in trade with BRI nations 
increased by more than seven times over the last two decades. China and 
Russia served as its net importers, whereas West Asia & Africa and 
Southeast Asia served as its net exporters in which UAE and Bangladesh 
were the two-largest countries with net exported CO2 emissions of more 
than 10 Mt in 2015. India changed from a net importer to a net exporter 
with respect to the emissions embodied in trade with Europe from 1995 
to 2015. India and China had much in common in that they both acted as 
the net importers of emissions for Russia and Central Asia, as well as the 
net exporters of emissions for Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia & 
Africa, and Europe, even though India’s emissions were less than those 
of China. Likewise, in most cases, the values for TBEET between India 
and other regions or nations remained smaller than those for BEET. 
Overall, the carbon leakage of BRI was notable over the study period, 
particularly for China, Russia and India. The BEET values of these three 
countries with others were always positive in 1995 and 2015, except for 
Central Asia, who showed a negative BEET with these three nations. By 
comparison, the TBEET of the three nations were always much smaller 
than their BEET from 1995 to 2015. 
3.5. Decomposition of drivers of emissions growth 
We successively quantify various driving forces of the changes to CO2 
emissions of BRI nations by region among the divided periods (Fig. 7). 
Table 1 explicitly represents the contributions of all the drivers to 
emissions growth in BRI nations by period. The increment of CO2 
emissions in BRI nations experienced a rapid increase from 1995 to 
2010, and then slowed down in the fourth period. The decreasing carbon 
intensity was the only factor that reduced CO2 emissions from 1995 to 
2010. A shift in the role of Leontief structure from driver to an inhibitor 
of emissions was observed for BRI nations from 2010 to 2015 and, in 
particular, for CMR. The change in final demand per capita was a major 
driving force for emissions growth in BRI nations, with a contribution of 
more than 200% to the final scores across the four periods. The effect of 
Leontief structure was the second driver in the period of 1995 to 2010, 
and then was replaced by the population effect between 2010 and 2015. 
By contrast, the effects of the changes in the product structure of final 
demand and in the final demand structure were relatively small. 
The results at the regional level can help evaluate the contributions 
of different regions to the growth of emissions in BRI. For instance, the 
CMR showed a similar trend to BRI as a whole, as it contributed to 67% 
of total incremental emissions of BRI nations. Emission intensity as a 
measure of technical effect led to a decrease in the CMR’s emissions over 
these four periods. Meanwhile, the Leontief structure effect contributed 
0.78 Gt, 0.48 Gt, 1.61Gt, and − 1.14 Gt to the emissions growth in these 
four periods, respectively. Apart from the CMR, a notable increase in 
emissions can be observed for South Asia and West Asia & Africa, with 
Fig. 5. The changes in CO2 emission responsibilities of BRI nations between PBA, CBA and TCBA in 1995–2015.  
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an increase of 1.74 Gt and 1.36 Gt over the past two decades, respec-
tively. Europe was the only region whose emissions experienced a 
decrease of 0.35 Gt. For all the regions of BRI, the final demand per 
capita was the main driver of growth in emissions and, conversely, the 
carbon intensity was the main inhibitor. Population effect played an 
important role in emissions growth in all the regions, except for Europe, 
where it nevertheless acted as a negative factor. The same situation held 
true for the Leontief structure, which led to a decline in emissions of 
Europe in the first six years. 
Fig. 6. Magnitude and changes of BEET and TBEET between China, India, Russia, and other BRI regions in 1995–2015. Dark blue bar marks the value for BEET in 
1995, and light blue bar marks the added value of BEET from 1995 to 2015. Hence, the sum of the dark and light blue bars corresponds with the value for BEET in 
2015, and so does TBEET. For instance, China was a net importer of emissions for Russia, and a net exporter for Southeast Asia. Here the CMR was excluded as two- 
thirds of its three members (China and Russia) were already addressed separately. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is 
referred to the web version of this article.) 
Q. Lu et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Applied Energy 280 (2020) 115934
9
4. Discussion 
Recently, BRI has attracted growing interest and discussions glob-
ally. There have been increasingly closed economic connections be-
tween Asia and Europe with latent consequences for international trade 
[21]. Environmental challenges have been a main area of concern over 
the BRI [40,41,42], like the impact on biodiversity conservation [43], 
the dynamics of virtual water footprints [44], as well as the trade-offs 
between social benefits and environmental hazards [45]. The BRI has 
also been predicted to trigger an increase in global CO2 emissions [25] 
and speed up urbanization [10]. Even though we may take decades to 
witness these impacts, it is necessary to make some efforts to reduce 
potential hazards [45]. Of these, climate change is often at the center of 
discussion on BRI’s changing environment for many years. Despite the 
increasing research on CO2 emissions embodied in international trade, 
studies taking into account technological differences between countries 
in producing internationally traded goods are scarce, let alone those that 
made use of PBA, CBA and TCBA in a comparative sense. As such, there 
still seems to be ample room for discussions on this subject, particularly 
with a focus on BRI. 
Our analysis showed that, over the past two decades, the total 
emissions of BRI nations experienced a considerable rise during the 
research period, with a much faster growth rate than the RoW. It 
contributed to over 50% of global carbon footprint both from CBA and 
Fig. 7. Magnitude and changes of BRI’s CO2 emissions in 1995–2015. The plus signs represent the net changes of emissions over the past 5 years.  
Table 1 
Contributions of six factors to the change in BRI’s CO2 emissions in 1995–2015.  
Year CO2 intensity Leontief structure Product structure of final demand Final demand structure Final demand per capita Population 
1995–2000 − 339.07% 71.36% 5.86% 33.73% 264.05% 64.07% 
2000–2005 − 154.45% 18.15% 1.09% 0.55% 221.62% 13.04% 
2005–2010 − 231.79% 41.80% 3.08% − 1.03% 270.65% 17.29% 
2010–2015 − 81.23% − 46.47% − 0.44% − 0.56% 200.38% 28.33%  
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PBA perspectives, and around 53% of embodied carbon exports globally 
were from BRI in 2015. BRI had much higher emissions under PBA than 
under CBA, as the nations in BRI are mostly developing economies to 
which some emissions were shifted from developed economies. This was 
particularly true for China and India—the two largest emerging 
exported-oriented economies. Obviously, PBA on its own cannot fairly 
identify national responsibilities, especially for BRI nations, and CBA in 
principle seems to be both feasible and effective [46]. 
The improvement in carbon intensities and energy efficiencies, var-
ied among these nations over time [47], which however could not be 
assessed through PBA or CBA, but rather through TCBA. For nations that 
have a higher carbon footprint under TCBA than CBA, it makes sense to 
take immediate actions to reduce carbon intensities to reach the world 
average. Among them, China showed a stable trend of reducing carbon 
intensity [47]. Its domestic carbon intensity was improved at a speed 
faster than the world average, leading to a slower growth rate of carbon 
footprint with TCBA than that with CBA. This, to some extent, can be 
attributed to Chinese Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) aiming at not only reducing its CO2 intensity by 60%–65% 
based on the 2005 level but also peaking the total emissions by latest 
2030, by largely improving its energy efficiency and leveraging more 
renewable energy [48]. As another large emerging economy, India 
experienced faster growth in carbon footprint under PBA and TCBA, and 
a slower growth under CBA than China. 
With respect to other regions, there was no obvious improvement in 
TCBA, especially for South Asia, West Asia & Africa and Southeast Asia 
who had large emissions under TCBA which were even higher than those 
under PBA. Countries in these regions, such as India, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Thailand, were characterized by labor-intensive manu-
facturers, energy-intensive infrastructure and high-speed urbanization, 
causing their emission intensities to be much higher than that of China 
[49,50,51]. It implies that some production activities, particularly those 
conducted by carbon-intensive sectors, were likely to be relocated from 
China to other developing countries in the BRI. This is in keeping with 
recent studies reporting emission shifts among developing nations 
[6,47]. 
TCBA presents a new insight into testing the displacement hypothesis 
and measuring the impact of international trade on emissions [32]. The 
values of TBEET between these BRI nations indicated that carbon in-
tensities between trading partners were higher than the intensity of the 
global market. Moreover, carbon-intensive heavy industries in BRI 
tended to have a relatively greater contribution to the emissions 
embodied in exports [52]. Thus, improving carbon efficiency is still a 
critical step for BRI nations to mitigate carbon leakage. This is similar to 
general recommendations for the optimization of international trade 
based on global analyses [8,35]. 
The growths in final demand per capita, population and technolog-
ical changes were the key influencing factors for the growth of CO2 
emissions in BRI nations over the past two decades. The first two factors 
have boosted emissions, with a relatively reduced speed in the fourth 
period, while the third factor was the main driver of emissions reduc-
tion, which was consistent with previous results [5,36]. Remarkably, 
Leontief industrial structure changed from a driver to a hamper of 
emissions growth during the research period, implying that industrial 
structure has gradually been improved, particularly for China who has 
been intentionally transitioning to a more service-based economy [10]. 
Meanwhile, we found it interesting that the drivers of emissions growth 
in European countries were inherently different from others in BRI. One 
example is the decreasing population that served as a negative driver of 
emissions growth. The Leontief structure effect turning to a driver rep-
resents another example, suggesting there was not sufficiently sub-
stantial progress in improving industrial structure during the research 
period. 
The emission growth in BRI slowed down during the period of 
2010–2015, partly because of the Leontief industrial structure that 
started contributing to emissions reduction. However, the contributions 
of carbon intensity to emission mitigation have diminished since then, 
even though most BRI nations remained at a high level of carbon in-
tensity. Improving industrial structure, final demand structure and 
carbon efficiency therefore still deserve policy priorities for the BRI 
countries. To that end, promoting energy efficiency and abatement 
technology would be the most critical step for BRI nations due to rela-
tively poor technologies behind the world average. In the context of 
globalization, there has been a shift of global supply chains towards the 
developing countries [53], especially some around BRI inevitably. It is, 
therefore, important as well to improve the layout of industrial supply 
chains in support of a more reasonable geospatial separation of pro-
duction and consumption [1]. Meanwhile, BRI is also potentially 
considered to be the largest infrastructure development ever, so making 
effective strategies to limit the environmental impacts associated with 
infrastructure construction is of particular importance for emission 
mitigation [22,45]. 
In common with other studies, some limitations remain in this study 
with respect to methodologies and data availability. First, we 
acknowledge the uncertainty of the original data of Eora database, such 
as the price errors, spatial and sectoral aggregation and the choice of 
MRIO tables [54,55]. Second, when calculating technological differ-
ences, we emphasized on measuring the impacts of export-oriented 
emissions on global emissions and carbon leakage, as most of BRI na-
tions were net exporters of emissions embodied in trade. While we 
believe that TCBA represents a step ahead from the CBA by considering 
technological differences from the world average, it still has some 
methodological limitations that should be overcome in future work 
[16,32 33]. 
5. Conclusion 
This study conducted an in-depth investigation into the seriousness 
of carbon leakage and the drivers of emissions growth in 62 nations 
partnering the BRI over the past two decades by establishing MRIO and 
SDA models. We accounted for the carbon footprint under the PBA, CBA 
and TCBA in a comparative sense, with the purpose of creating a more 
holistic view of responsibility allocation. Moreover, we broke down the 
drivers of emissions growth in these nations into six factors, namely the 
CO2 intensity effect, the Leontief structure effect, the effect of product 
structure of final demand, the final demand structure effect, the final 
demand per capita effect, and the population effect. 
We found it interesting that BRI countries contributed to over 50% 
and 92% of global carbon footprint and its increase between 1995 and 
2015, respectively, with a much faster growth rate than RoW. The BRI 
overall acted as a large net exporter of emissions embodied in interna-
tional trade, even though its carbon footprint with TCBA maintained at a 
very high level due to relatively high carbon intensity. China accounted 
for half of the CO2 emissions in BRI while having shown some positive 
improvements in its energy efficiency, which was at a speed faster than 
the world average. Despite less improvement in TCBA, India experi-
enced similar trends with China in terms of carbon footprint, whose 
growth under PBA and TCBA was faster than under CBA. 
With respect to carbon leakage among BRI nations, China, India and 
Russia overall played essential roles as net carbon exporters for other 
BRI nations. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia and West Asia & Africa serving 
as exporters of emissions in the global market showed no obvious 
improvement in TCBA, thus would be likely to increase their carbon 
footprints under both PBA and CBA. 
The growth in final demand per capita and population were found to 
be key drivers of emissions in most of the BRI nations, whereas tech-
nological change was the key driver of emissions reduction. Leontief 
industrial structure tended to decrease emissions in the last period, 
indicating gradual industrial structure upgrading, especially in the CMR. 
A different phenomenon occurred in Europe, however, where the pop-
ulation and Leontief structure effects acted as negative and positive 
drivers of emissions growth, respectively. 
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China, the major advocator for BRI, has been observed that it 
benefitted from CO2 emissions embodied in the trade with other BRI 
countries. China has taken some policy actions for a low-carbon tran-
sition by adopting new clean technologies and higher environmental 
standards, increasing the use of green financing instruments, and 
expanding international cooperation on climate governance, which has 
been declared as part of the green BRI construction in its Ecological and 
Environmental Cooperation Plan [56]. However, more concrete policy 
measures are still required to reduce importing carbon-intensive prod-
ucts from BRI countries whose production technologies are lower than 
the world average. From a broader point of view, in struggling towards a 
sustainable society, more attention should be paid to creating policy 
synergies between the green BRI, the Paris Agreement, and the United 
Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
To sum up, this paper provided new insights into carbon leakage 
among these BRI nations by considering consumption and production 
and technological differences within BRI countries and their relation-
ships with the whole world, as well as by identifying the drivers of 
emissions of BRI nations. Even though we have managed to conduct a 
multi-dimensional assessment of carbon leakage with a 20-year span 
among over 60 nations under CBA, PBA and TCBA, future work needs to 
explore this topic in a global context with a broader point of view. For 
instance, it remains to be seen whether every BRI nation will achieve its 
INDCs, whether the BRI will continuously drive the global map of carbon 
footprint, and how the transfer of specific power or manufacturing 
sectors from one BRI country to others affects the low carbon transition 
in this area. These research avenues are interesting to be pursued. 
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